Adds an opt-in hard per-session memory ceiling on top of patch #9's scoped-OOM. The exec already ships the full OCI Spec, so the limit rides spec.linux.resources.memory.limit — no RPC/protobuf change: - host framework: LinuxProcessConfiguration.memoryLimitInBytes; LinuxContainer.exec stamps it onto the exec spec. - guest: Server+GRPC.createProcess reads it back and applies it as the exec cgroup's memory.max (new Cgroup2Manager.setMemoryMax) via createExec/ManagedProcess. - Nucleic: ContainerServiceSettings.controlPerSessionMemoryGiB (default 0 = off), applied only to the shared control container (ContainerManager.exec); wired through ContainerEngine.exec. So one session can't consume the whole shared container's memory before its own (oom.group-scoped) OOM. Default off preserves #9's behavior. Compile-verified host + musl guest; rides the pending -nucleic2 image, still runtime-pending. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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Vendored containerization — Nucleic patches
This is a vendored copy of apple/containerization
at upstream commit 6b7b42ca3efeee8c706070e4355e6a807c5336ae, referenced by the root Package.swift
via .package(path: "third_party/containerization") instead of the github URL.
It is vendored (not pulled) because we carry a local patch upstream doesn't have. Keeping it in-tree means the patch can't be lost to a dependency re-resolve.
What's changed vs. upstream
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Sources/Containerization/LinuxContainer.swift— forward VM extensions.LinuxContainer.Configurationgains avmExtensions: [any Sendable]field, andLinuxContainerassigns it intoVMConfiguration.extensionswhen it builds the VM config. Upstream already supportsVMConfiguration.extensions+ theVZInstanceExtensionhook (configureVZ/didCreate), butLinuxContainer— the only entry point we use — never forwarded it, so there was no way to attach a device (e.g. a virtio memory balloon) to a container's VM. Search for the marker comment[Nucleic vendored patch]to find both edit sites.Nucleic uses this to attach a
VZVirtioTraditionalMemoryBalloonDeviceConfigurationand drive its target at runtime for automatic VM memory reclamation — seeMemoryBalloon.swift/ContainerEnginein NucleicCore. -
Sources/Containerization/LinuxProcess.swift— process-group kill.LinuxProcessgainskillProcessGroup(_:), which signals the negative pid (-pid) so the guest'skill(2)targets the exec'd process's whole process group, not just the leader. Every exec issetsid()'d byvmexec, so the process is its own group leader (pgid == pid) and a group signal reaches the children it forked. Upstream only exposes the leader-onlykill(_:), which let a forked child survive a Stop in a long-lived shared container. Marked with[Nucleic vendored patch]; used byContainerizedProcessHandle.sendSignalin NucleicCore. -
Sources/Containerization/LinuxProcess.swift— stdio-connection diagnostics (log-only).setupIOlogs (os.Logger, subsystemcom.nucleic, categorycontainer-io) when a configured stdio stream's guest side never connects — which leaves its hostFileHandlenil, so the relay / readability handler is never wired and the agent's stdin is never delivered (it hangs) or its stdout is never read (the "no output, just a spinner" symptom in Nucleic Control containers). Behavior is unchanged; it only surfaces the failing stream. Marked[Nucleic vendored patch](theimport os, thenucleicIOLogstatic, and the per-stream check insetupIO). All three are wrapped in#if canImport(os)— non-Xcode toolchains (e.g. a swiftly Swift used to cross-build the host framework) resolve Foundation/Virtualization but not theosoverlay, so the diagnostic degrades to a no-op there instead of failing the build; Xcode (the localmake vminit-imagepath) builds keep it. -
Trimmed for footprint (no behavior change).
Tests/,docs/,examples/, andimages/were dropped, and the corresponding.testTarget(...)entries removed fromPackage.swift. The library/executable targets we build are untouched. -
Sources/Containerization/LinuxProcess.swift— non-blocking stdio relay. Upstream'ssetupIOrelays guest stdout/stderr withFileHandle.availableData, a blocking read, from inside areadabilityHandler. Those handlers run on Foundation's shared readability queue, so if one exec's guest stdout wedged mid-stream that blocking read parked the shared thread and head-of-line-blocked every other exec's stdout/stderr relay across all containers — one stuck session froze the others. The patch marks each connected fdO_NONBLOCKand drains it via a newnucleicDrainNonBlocking(returns bytes + EOF, never blocks; EAGAIN just waits for the next readable event). A wedged stream is now contained to its own exec. Marked[Nucleic vendored patch](the two static helpersnucleicSetNonBlocking/nucleicDrainNonBlockingand the two rewrittenreadabilityHandlerblocks). Requires host-side POSIXread/fcntl/errno. -
Sources/Containerization/LinuxProcess.swift— atomic stdio-or-abort start. Instart(), aftersetupIOreturns, if a configured stdio stream never connected from the guest (itsFileHandleis nil — patch #3's logged failure), the patch tears the just-created exec back down (agent.deleteProcess) and throws instead of callingstartProcess. Upstream proceeds and runs a process with a dead stream (stdin never delivered → hangs; stdout never read → the "no output, just a spinner" 60s stall in Nucleic Control). Now that permanent silent stall surfaces as a clean, retryable start error. Marked[Nucleic vendored patch](the guard block beforestartProcess). -
Sources/Containerization/Vminitd.swift— bounded teardown RPC.deleteProcessnow sends a 30sCallOptions.timeout(upstream sends none, so it can block forever on a wedged agent channel). Nucleic callsLinuxProcess.delete()after every turn to reclaim the per-exec vsock/gRPC connectionexec()dials; an unboundeddeleteProcesswould let that reclaim hang and the connection leak. On the thrown deadline,performDeletionstill closes the agent connection. Marked[Nucleic vendored patch](thecallOptsblock indeleteProcess). NOTE: this pairs with a Nucleic-side change inContainerizedProcessHandle(calldelete()after the exec exits / on force-close) — without that caller, upstream never deletes execs at all and the shared control container leaks a connection +runConnections()task per turn.
GUEST-side patches (require rebuilding the initfs — see below)
Patches #1–#7 are host-side (the Containerization library), shipped by a normal swift build.
Patches #8+ live in vminitd/ (the guest agent), which rides in the initfs OCI image. They are INERT
until that image is rebuilt from this source and published, and ContainerEngine.vminitReference
points at it. Build it with make vminit-image (root Makefile) — it builds cctl + the guest
vminitd/vmexec from this vendored tree and packages ghcr.io/abkslm/vminit:<tag> into the local cctl
store; make vminit-image-push publishes it (authenticate once with make vminit-image-login, which
stores a GHCR token in the macOS Keychain — or set REGISTRY_HOST/USERNAME/TOKEN), and
vminitReference is pinned to that custom image. First time on a machine, run make vminit-image-prep once (installs
the swiftly toolchain + musl SDK the guest cross-build needs). Bump the -nucleicN tag suffix and
rebuild whenever a guest patch changes. Built locally, not in CI: the host framework needs the macOS
26+ Virtualization SDK that GitHub-hosted runners lack.
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vminitd/Sources/VminitdCore/ManagedProcess.swift— offload the blocking start off the event loop.ManagedProcess.start()did synchronous, potentially slow pipe reads (waiting forvmexecto return the pid, then for the error pipe to close) while holdingstate's Mutex, ON the calling task — which is the gRPC handler's event-loop thread. A slow start therefore parked the loop and head-of-line-blocked sibling execs' control RPCs sharing it. The patch splits the body into a synchronousstartBlocking()and an asyncstart()that runs it onDispatchQueue.globalvia a checked continuation, keeping the loop responsive. Safe because the body has noawaitandManagedProcessisSendable. Marked[Nucleic vendored patch]. -
Per-exec cgroups (OOM/CPU/pids isolation). Upstream puts the container init AND every exec in ONE cgroup (
/container/<id>), so one session's runaway RSS trips the in-VM OOM-killer against a random sibling, and a fork bomb / CPU hog hits the whole box. This patch makes/container/<id>an intermediary: the resource ceiling stays on it,ManagedContainer.initmoves the init into its own leaf (/container/<id>/init) which enablescgroup.subtree_controlup the chain, andManagedProcess.startplaces each exec in its OWN child (/container/<id>/<execID>) withmemory.oom.group=1(a runaway session's OOM kills only its tree), a faircpu.weight, and apids.maxfork-bomb backstop. NewCgroup2Managerhelpers:setOomGroup/setCpuWeight/setPidsMax/remove. Best-effort with a graceful fallback: if any step of the per-exec setup fails it wipes the partial state and reverts to the flat layout, andManagedProcessfalls back to the container cgroup per exec — so a cgroup hiccup degrades to today's behavior, never a failed start.ManagedContainer.execCgroupParent == nilmarks flat mode.Beyond scoped-OOM, a hard host-configured per-exec
memory.maxis also wired — WITHOUT a protobuf change, because the exec already ships the full OCISpecand the guest just ignoredlinux.resources. Host:LinuxProcessConfiguration.memoryLimitInBytes→LinuxContainer.execstamps it ontospec.linux.resources.memory.limit. Guest:Server+GRPC.createProcessreads that back and passes it tocreateExec/ManagedProcess, which setsmemory.max(newCgroup2Manager.setMemoryMax) on the exec's cgroup — so a session can't consume the whole box before its own OOM. Driven by Nucleic'sContainerServiceSettings.controlPerSessionMemoryGiB(default 0 = off; applied only to the shared control container, viaContainerManager.exec), so the default stays scoped-OOM-only. Marked[Nucleic vendored patch]acrossCgroup2Manager.swift,ManagedContainer.swift,ManagedProcess.swift,Server+GRPC.swift(guest) andLinuxProcessConfiguration.swift,LinuxContainer.swift(host). COMPILE-VERIFIED (host + musl cross-build); NOT yet runtime-validated — a wrong cgroup-v2 hierarchy fails at runtime, so boot a container with the new image and confirm sessions start,/sys/fs/cgroup/container/<id>/<execID>exists per session, and a hog is contained, before pointing a shipping build at it.vmexec/RunCommandis unchanged: it still applieslinux.resourcesatlinux.cgroupsPath, which the patch repoints (init leaf) and clears accordingly.
Re-vendoring a newer upstream commit
git cloneupstream (or copy.build/checkouts/containerizationafter bumping the URL pin temporarily), check out the desired commit.rsync -a --exclude=.git --exclude=.build --exclude=.swiftpm --exclude=Tests/ --exclude=docs/ \ --exclude=images/ <upstream>/ third_party/containerization/- Remove the
.testTarget(...)blocks fromthird_party/containerization/Package.swift. - Re-apply patch #1 (the
vmExtensionsfield + thevmConfig.extensions = …forward), patch #2 (LinuxProcess.killProcessGroup(_:)), patch #3 (thesetupIOstdio-connection log + itsimport os/nucleicIOLog), patch #5 (the non-blocking stdio relay:nucleicSetNonBlocking/nucleicDrainNonBlocking+ the rewrittenreadabilityHandlerblocks), and patch #6 (the atomic stdio-or-abort guard instart()), patch #7 (the boundeddeleteProcesstimeout inVminitd.swift), and patch #8 (theManagedProcess.startevent-loop offload invminitd/). Grep for[Nucleic vendored patch]to find every site, and patch #9 (per-exec cgroups) acrossCgroup2Manager.swift/ManagedContainer.swift/ManagedProcess.swift. After re-applying anyvminitd/patch, rebuild + publish the custom init image withmake vminit-image+make vminit-image-push, and bumpContainerEngine.vminitReference. - Update the commit hash above and in the root
Package.swiftcomment. swift buildand run the balloon tests.