abkslmandClaude Opus 4.8
0f9957d5e5
cctl login stores the credential in the macOS Keychain, which cctl images push reads automatically — so pushing needs no REGISTRY_* env vars after a one-time login. Env vars remain as a fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
137 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
137 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
# Vendored `containerization` — Nucleic patches
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This is a **vendored copy** of [apple/containerization](https://github.com/apple/containerization)
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at upstream commit `6b7b42ca3efeee8c706070e4355e6a807c5336ae`, referenced by the root `Package.swift`
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via `.package(path: "third_party/containerization")` instead of the github URL.
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It is vendored (not pulled) because we carry a local patch upstream doesn't have. Keeping it
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in-tree means the patch can't be lost to a dependency re-resolve.
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## What's changed vs. upstream
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1. **`Sources/Containerization/LinuxContainer.swift` — forward VM extensions.**
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`LinuxContainer.Configuration` gains a `vmExtensions: [any Sendable]` field, and
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`LinuxContainer` assigns it into `VMConfiguration.extensions` when it builds the VM config.
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Upstream already supports `VMConfiguration.extensions` + the `VZInstanceExtension` hook
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(`configureVZ`/`didCreate`), but `LinuxContainer` — the only entry point we use — never forwarded
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it, so there was no way to attach a device (e.g. a virtio memory balloon) to a container's VM.
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Search for the marker comment `[Nucleic vendored patch]` to find both edit sites.
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Nucleic uses this to attach a `VZVirtioTraditionalMemoryBalloonDeviceConfiguration` and drive its
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target at runtime for automatic VM memory reclamation — see `MemoryBalloon.swift` /
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`ContainerEngine` in NucleicCore.
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2. **`Sources/Containerization/LinuxProcess.swift` — process-group kill.**
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`LinuxProcess` gains `killProcessGroup(_:)`, which signals the negative pid (`-pid`) so the
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guest's `kill(2)` targets the exec'd process's whole **process group**, not just the leader.
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Every exec is `setsid()`'d by `vmexec`, so the process is its own group leader (pgid == pid) and
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a group signal reaches the children it forked. Upstream only exposes the leader-only `kill(_:)`,
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which let a forked child survive a Stop in a long-lived shared container. Marked with
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`[Nucleic vendored patch]`; used by `ContainerizedProcessHandle.sendSignal` in NucleicCore.
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3. **`Sources/Containerization/LinuxProcess.swift` — stdio-connection diagnostics (log-only).**
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`setupIO` logs (`os.Logger`, subsystem `com.nucleic`, category `container-io`) when a *configured*
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stdio stream's guest side never connects — which leaves its host `FileHandle` nil, so the relay /
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readability handler is never wired and the agent's stdin is never delivered (it hangs) or its
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stdout is never read (the "no output, just a spinner" symptom in Nucleic Control containers).
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Behavior is unchanged; it only surfaces the failing stream. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]`
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(the `import os`, the `nucleicIOLog` static, and the per-stream check in `setupIO`). All three are
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wrapped in `#if canImport(os)` — non-Xcode toolchains (e.g. a swiftly Swift used to cross-build the
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host framework) resolve Foundation/Virtualization but not the `os` overlay, so the diagnostic
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degrades to a no-op there instead of failing the build; Xcode (the local `make vminit-image` path)
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builds keep it.
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4. **Trimmed for footprint (no behavior change).** `Tests/`, `docs/`, `examples/`, and `images/`
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were dropped, and the corresponding `.testTarget(...)` entries removed from `Package.swift`. The
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library/executable targets we build are untouched.
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5. **`Sources/Containerization/LinuxProcess.swift` — non-blocking stdio relay.**
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Upstream's `setupIO` relays guest stdout/stderr with `FileHandle.availableData`, a **blocking**
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read, from inside a `readabilityHandler`. Those handlers run on Foundation's shared readability
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queue, so if one exec's guest stdout wedged mid-stream that blocking read parked the shared thread
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and head-of-line-blocked **every** other exec's stdout/stderr relay across all containers — one
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stuck session froze the others. The patch marks each connected fd `O_NONBLOCK` and drains it via a
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new `nucleicDrainNonBlocking` (returns bytes + EOF, never blocks; EAGAIN just waits for the next
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readable event). A wedged stream is now contained to its own exec. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]`
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(the two static helpers `nucleicSetNonBlocking`/`nucleicDrainNonBlocking` and the two rewritten
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`readabilityHandler` blocks). Requires host-side POSIX `read`/`fcntl`/`errno`.
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6. **`Sources/Containerization/LinuxProcess.swift` — atomic stdio-or-abort start.**
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In `start()`, after `setupIO` returns, if a *configured* stdio stream never connected from the
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guest (its `FileHandle` is nil — patch #3's logged failure), the patch tears the just-created exec
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back down (`agent.deleteProcess`) and throws instead of calling `startProcess`. Upstream proceeds
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and runs a process with a dead stream (stdin never delivered → hangs; stdout never read → the "no
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output, just a spinner" 60s stall in Nucleic Control). Now that permanent silent stall surfaces as
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a clean, retryable start error. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]` (the guard block before
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`startProcess`).
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7. **`Sources/Containerization/Vminitd.swift` — bounded teardown RPC.**
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`deleteProcess` now sends a 30s `CallOptions.timeout` (upstream sends none, so it can block
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forever on a wedged agent channel). Nucleic calls `LinuxProcess.delete()` after every turn to
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reclaim the per-exec vsock/gRPC connection `exec()` dials; an unbounded `deleteProcess` would let
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that reclaim hang and the connection leak. On the thrown deadline, `performDeletion` still closes
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the agent connection. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]` (the `callOpts` block in `deleteProcess`).
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NOTE: this pairs with a Nucleic-side change in `ContainerizedProcessHandle` (call `delete()` after
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the exec exits / on force-close) — without that caller, upstream never deletes execs at all and
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the shared control container leaks a connection + `runConnections()` task per turn.
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### GUEST-side patches (require rebuilding the initfs — see below)
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Patches #1–#7 are host-side (the `Containerization` library), shipped by a normal `swift build`.
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Patches #8+ live in `vminitd/` (the guest agent), which rides in the initfs OCI image. They are INERT
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until that image is rebuilt from this source and published, and `ContainerEngine.vminitReference`
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points at it. Build it with **`make vminit-image`** (root Makefile) — it builds cctl + the guest
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vminitd/vmexec from this vendored tree and packages `ghcr.io/abkslm/vminit:<tag>` into the local cctl
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store; `make vminit-image-push` publishes it (authenticate once with `make vminit-image-login`, which
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stores a GHCR token in the macOS Keychain — or set `REGISTRY_HOST`/`USERNAME`/`TOKEN`), and
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`vminitReference` is pinned to that custom image. First time on a machine, run `make vminit-image-prep` once (installs
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the swiftly toolchain + musl SDK the guest cross-build needs). Bump the `-nucleicN` tag suffix and
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rebuild whenever a guest patch changes. Built locally, not in CI: the host framework needs the macOS
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26+ Virtualization SDK that GitHub-hosted runners lack.
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8. **`vminitd/Sources/VminitdCore/ManagedProcess.swift` — offload the blocking start off the event loop.**
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`ManagedProcess.start()` did synchronous, potentially slow pipe reads (waiting for `vmexec` to
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return the pid, then for the error pipe to close) while holding `state`'s Mutex, ON the calling
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task — which is the gRPC handler's event-loop thread. A slow start therefore parked the loop and
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head-of-line-blocked sibling execs' control RPCs sharing it. The patch splits the body into a
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synchronous `startBlocking()` and an async `start()` that runs it on `DispatchQueue.global` via a
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checked continuation, keeping the loop responsive. Safe because the body has no `await` and
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`ManagedProcess` is `Sendable`. Marked `[Nucleic vendored patch]`.
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### PLANNED guest patch (design recorded; NOT yet implemented)
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9. **Per-exec cgroups (memory/cpu/pids isolation).** Today the whole container shares ONE cgroup
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(`/container/<id>`): `vmexec run` places the init there via the OCI `cgroupsPath` + `applyResources`
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(`RunCommand.swift`), and each exec joins it via `loadFromPid(init.pid).addProcess` in
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`ManagedProcess.start`. So one session's runaway RSS trips the VM OOM-killer against a *random*
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sibling. Target layout (cgroup v2): make `/container/<id>` an intermediary (enable
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`cgroup.subtree_control` — `Cgroup2Manager.toggleSubtreeControllers` already skips the leaf so this
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composes), move init to a leaf `/container/<id>/init`, and place each exec in its own leaf
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`/container/<id>/<execID>` with generous `memory.high`/`memory.max`/`cpu.max`/`pids.max` so a
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runaway session is throttled/OOM-killed *within its own cgroup*, siblings untouched — WITHOUT
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hard-partitioning RAM (soft limits preserve burst). This is CROSS-CUTTING, not a one-file patch:
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the per-exec limits must be carried on the exec RPC (the `CreateProcess`/exec OCI spec has no
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resources field today), which means a protobuf field (`SandboxContext`) + host-side plumbing
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(`Vminitd.createProcess` / `ContainerEngine.exec`) in addition to the vminitd cgroup restructure
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(`ManagedContainer`, `ManagedProcess`, `vmexec/RunCommand`). Sequence it after #8 lands via CI, and
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validate in a real container (a wrong v2 hierarchy fails at runtime, not at compile).
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## Re-vendoring a newer upstream commit
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1. `git clone` upstream (or copy `.build/checkouts/containerization` after bumping the URL pin
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temporarily), check out the desired commit.
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2. `rsync -a --exclude=.git --exclude=.build --exclude=.swiftpm --exclude=Tests/ --exclude=docs/ \
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--exclude=images/ <upstream>/ third_party/containerization/`
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3. Remove the `.testTarget(...)` blocks from `third_party/containerization/Package.swift`.
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4. Re-apply patch #1 (the `vmExtensions` field + the `vmConfig.extensions = …` forward), patch #2
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(`LinuxProcess.killProcessGroup(_:)`), patch #3 (the `setupIO` stdio-connection log + its
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`import os` / `nucleicIOLog`), patch #5 (the non-blocking stdio relay: `nucleicSetNonBlocking` /
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`nucleicDrainNonBlocking` + the rewritten `readabilityHandler` blocks), and patch #6 (the atomic
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stdio-or-abort guard in `start()`), patch #7 (the bounded `deleteProcess` timeout in
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`Vminitd.swift`), and patch #8 (the `ManagedProcess.start` event-loop offload in `vminitd/`). Grep
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for `[Nucleic vendored patch]` to find every site. Patch #9 (per-exec cgroups) is design-only so
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far — see its entry. After re-applying any `vminitd/` patch, rebuild + publish the custom init image
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with `make vminit-image` + `make vminit-image-push`, and bump `ContainerEngine.vminitReference`.
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5. Update the commit hash above and in the root `Package.swift` comment.
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6. `swift build` and run the balloon tests.
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